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In adhering to the line of policy which was pursued, it was necessary he should observe, that a great distinction existed between the course of the preceding year, and that which was now concluded. For his own part, he should regret the generous and disinterested conduct of the Allies towards France in the year 1814, though, perhaps, if looked at in conjunction with the results that afterwards occurred, it might be wished that it had never been adopted. But what human transaction would bear to be considered, or would endure the application of after occurrences in determining its abstract wisdom or prudence? [Hear, hear.] If the Allies, when they conquered the peace of 1814—when the French nation seemed ready to leap into their arms, and into the arms of their legitimate King—when only one strong and electric feeling appeared to be entertained throughout the whole country, a feeling of joy and gratitude at being delivered from those tyrants if at that moment they had refused to show the generous enthusiasm of the nation, and pursued a stern and angry policy, if they had carried on the war with the determination of destroying Bonaparte and his adherents, instead of accepting his submission and permitting his departure, he was confident they would have been accused of interested and narrow views of policy, and of having clouded that horizon which looked so calm and beautiful to all who observed it. It was, on the

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He apprehended, however, if the Hon. and Learned Gentleman, who referred to that despatch of Lord Clancarty, had read the sentence which he quoted in connection with the next sentence, he would have found the principle distinctly avowed, that though we never declared the object of the war to be for the purpose of imposing on France any form of Government, or that the restoration of the Bourbons was the *sine qua non* upon which we were prepared to treat for peace, yet other views entered into our calculations, if they could be accomplished by just and lawful means. We certainly objected to Bonaparte as the Sovereign of France; but did it therefore follow, that we had no choice as to who might be the Sovereign, or that we were so blind as not to prefer the establishment of a Government in the person of that individual with whom relations of amity could be most securely maintained, to the erection of any other Government, at the head of which perhaps might be placed a person growing out of that military system, to abate the odium of which had been the primary object of the alliance. He declared that there was any thing in the letter of Lord Clancarty which gave any shadow of authority for such a construction to be put upon it, and he would refer the House to the declaration made by His Majesty's Government, in the ratification of the treaty of the 25th of March. He would now proceed to consider the general principle asserted the other evening by an Hon. and Learned Gentleman, that no country had a right to interfere in the internal government of another country. If the Hon. and Learned Gentleman intended merely to support the abstract principle, that all wanton interference of such a nature was unjustifiable, he perfectly coincided with him.—But, on the other hand, if the Hon. and Learned Gentleman contended, either on general reasoning or on the political practice of nations, that any country was tied up from interfering in the state of a foreign country, when that state had an influence on its own interests and its own security, he (Lord C.) denied the validity of such an argument. If it were admitted, it would indeed open the door to the greatest dangers. It had always been the recognized usage of nations, that any great principle, affecting not only one country but other countries, was the legitimate object of foreign interference; and in no case had this principle been more distinctly allowed than in questions of succession. In order to satisfy the Hon. Gentleman opposite, he would address Whig authority to show, that this principle of foreign interference had been decidedly recognized in this country; and he should be happy if, by so doing, he could persuade the Whigs of modern times to abate the violence of their hostility to any such transaction, and induce them to return to the better opinion of their ancestors. If he wanted a precedent which more strongly than another established this fact, he would refer to that most pure period of Whig ascendancy in politics, 1717, when the Triple Alliance was formed. The objects of those treaties were to establish and maintain the Protestant succession within these realms, and the Protestant succession in the Kingdoms of Spain and Sicily. He believed that France would be able to pay the contributions which had been demanded of her, and that she intended paying them.—The contributions demanded could be met by the resources of that country—by the sale of Crown lands, by the augmentation of the capital of her national debt, she might be enabled honourably to fulfil her engagements. France, it had been stipulated, should pay an indemnity to the Allies the sum of 700,000,000 livres (28 or 29,000,000 sterling); but this was, comparatively speaking, a very inconsiderable payment, when put by the side of the other expenses which the late war had thrown upon her. In addition to this 290,000,000 francs, she had engaged to maintain an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men belonging to the Allies for five years. The expense of each thousand men could not be estimated at less than 1,000,000 of livres per annum; this army therefore would cost France yearly the sum of 150,000,000. From this it would be seen the sums which France would have to pay in five years, for the maintenance of this army, would be 750,000,000 of livres, making, with the 700,000,000 given to the Allies as an indemnity, a total of 1,450,000,000 livres. By a Convention concluded, the French Government had engaged to pay 120 livres a man (about 2s) on the whole force of 1,312,000 men, which had marched into France to conquer peace, and the last payment due on this account had been made. The ex-

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Lord MILTON moved an amendment similar to the one moved in the House of Lords by Lord Grey.

M. LYTTLETON supported the original Address most ably.

Sir JAMES MACKINTOSH spoke in favour of the amendment.

The Debate was then, upon the motion of Mr. TERNLEY, adjourned.

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Mr. HORNER said, it must be within the recollection of the House, that, when it was put to the Noble Lord, whether the restoration of the Bourbons was the object of the war, he distinctly and repeatedly disclaimed it. Yet it was now evident, from the Treaty upon the Table, that the restoration of the Bourbons, and then maintenance upon the Throne of France, was really and truly the object of the war. Why then was not this object openly and manfully avowed at the outset?—With what view was it disguised? Why, obviously, for the purpose of obtaining votes in that House, and procuring a declaration in favour of the Whigs, and upon Europe. Many Frenchmen believe those declarations, construed as they so often were by the solemn pledges of the Ministers of England. But the believers were dupes. For himself, as well as for several of his friends, he could state, that he never was duped by these declarations, or by the pledges of the Noble Lord, because he always thought that to be the sole object of the war, which events had demonstrated. If it were pretended, as he understood had been somewhere said, that the conduct of the French army in invading the Netherlands released the Allies from their pledges not to force a Government upon France, he would ask the Noble Lord and his colleagues whether they, who always alleged that the French People were hostile to Bonaparte, and that he was supported only by the army, could consistently maintain that the conduct of that army could release the Allies from their solemn pledges to the People not to force any particular Government upon France; and it appeared that, such a view maintained in national credit, and thirdly, it was to be remembered, that if she failed to do this, we should then stand in the same situation in which we had stood when, in the opinion of some Gentlemen, we ought to have insisted upon other terms, founded upon permanent cessions of territory to be made by France. He believed that France would be able to pay the contributions which had been demanded of her, and that she intended paying them.—The contributions demanded could be met by the resources of that country—by the sale of Crown lands, by the augmentation of the capital of her national debt, she might be enabled honourably to fulfil her engagements. France, it had been stipulated, should pay an indemnity to the Allies the sum of 700,000,000 livres (28 or 29,000,000 sterling); but this was, comparatively speaking, a very inconsiderable payment, when put by the side of the other expenses which the late war had thrown upon her. In addition to this 290,000,000 francs, she had engaged to maintain an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men belonging to the Allies for five years. The expense of each thousand men could not be estimated at less than 1,000,000 of livres per annum; this army therefore would cost France yearly the sum of 150,000,000. From this it would be seen the sums which France would have to pay in five years, for the maintenance of this army, would be 750,000,000 of livres, making, with the 700,000,000 given to the Allies as an indemnity, a total of 1,450,000,000 livres. By a Convention concluded, the French Government had engaged to pay 120 livres a man (about 2s) on the whole force of 1,312,000 men, which had marched into France to conquer peace, and the last payment due on this account had been made. The ex-

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First, the general principle, and the general ground of political necessity, upon which interference could be justified; and secondly, a more partial view of the particular situation in which the Allies stood with respect to France. A reference had been made on a former evening to a letter written by Lord Clancarty, from a single sentence of which, it was attempted to be adduced, that we entered upon the late war for the single and exclusive object of deposing Bonaparte, and that, provided he did not reign, it would be a matter of perfect indifference to us who was at the head of the French Government. He apprehended, however, if the Hon. and Learned Gentleman, who referred to that despatch of Lord Clancarty, had read the sentence which he quoted in connection with the next sentence, he would have found the principle distinctly avowed, that though we never declared the object of the war to be for the purpose of imposing on France any form of Government, or that the restoration of the Bourbons was the *sine qua non* upon which we were prepared to treat for peace, yet other views entered into our calculations, if they could be accomplished by just and lawful means. We certainly objected to Bonaparte as the Sovereign of France; but did it therefore follow, that we had no choice as to who might be the Sovereign, or that we were so blind as not to prefer the establishment of a Government in the person of that individual with whom relations of amity could be most securely maintained, to the erection of any other Government, at the head of which perhaps might be placed a person growing out of that military system, to abate the odium of which had been the primary object of the alliance. He declared that there was any thing in the letter of Lord Clancarty which gave any shadow of authority for such a construction to be put upon it, and he would refer the House to the declaration made by His Majesty's Government, in the ratification of the treaty of the 25th of March. He would now proceed to consider the general principle asserted the other evening by an Hon. and Learned Gentleman, that no country had a right to interfere in the internal government of another country. If the Hon. and Learned Gentleman intended merely to support the abstract principle, that all wanton interference of such a nature was unjustifiable, he perfectly coincided with him.—But, on the other hand, if the Hon. and Learned Gentleman contended, either on general reasoning or on the political practice of nations, that any country was tied up from interfering in the state of a foreign country, when that state had an influence on its own interests and its own security, he (Lord C.) denied the validity of such an argument. If it were admitted, it would indeed open the door to the greatest dangers. It had always been the recognized usage of nations, that any great principle, affecting not only one country but other countries, was the legitimate object of foreign interference; and in no case had this principle been more distinctly allowed than in questions of succession. In order to satisfy the Hon. Gentleman opposite, he would address Whig authority to show, that this principle of foreign interference had been decidedly recognized in this country; and he should be happy if, by so doing, he could persuade the Whigs of modern times to abate the violence of their hostility to any such transaction, and induce them to return to the better opinion of their ancestors. If he wanted a precedent which more strongly than another established this fact, he would refer to that most pure period of Whig ascendancy in politics, 1717, when the Triple Alliance was formed. The objects of those treaties were to establish and maintain the Protestant succession within these realms, and the Protestant succession in the Kingdoms of Spain and Sicily. He believed that France would be able to pay the contributions which had been demanded of her, and that she intended paying them.—The contributions demanded could be met by the resources of that country—by the sale of Crown lands, by the augmentation of the capital of her national debt, she might be enabled honourably to fulfil her engagements. France, it had been stipulated, should pay an indemnity to the Allies the sum of 700,000,000 livres (28 or 29,000,000 sterling); but this was, comparatively speaking, a very inconsiderable payment, when put by the side of the other expenses which the late war had thrown upon her. In addition to this 290,000,000 francs, she had engaged to maintain an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men belonging to the Allies for five years. The expense of each thousand men could not be estimated at less than 1,000,000 of livres per annum; this army therefore would cost France yearly the sum of 150,000,000. From this it would be seen the sums which France would have to pay in five years, for the maintenance of this army, would be 750,000,000 of livres, making, with the 700,000,000 given to the Allies as an indemnity, a total of 1,450,000,000 livres. By a Convention concluded, the French Government had engaged to pay 120 livres a man (about 2s) on the whole force of 1,312,000 men, which had marched into France to conquer peace, and the last payment due on this account had been made. The ex-

penditure of this vast force had been borne by France for five or six months, and they added to those which he had already named, and other charges which had been thrown on her, brought the total expense of the invasion which she had sustained up to a sum of not less than 2000 millions of livres—about 800,000,000 sterling. If any thing were done by this country, which at all went to separate its interests from those of its Allies, he was convinced that we should not only give up the advantages felt from their influence, but we should do that which would tend to keep up that military spirit in Europe, which was deplorable to see lowered. [Hear, hear!] Though the other powers in Europe had not been thrown into those monstrous exertions of military efforts which had been witnessed in France, still it could not be denied, that there existed in them a warlike spirit, which could not immediately subside; and he went along with those on the opposite side, who were of opinion, that a perfect state of peace could never be obtained until that spirit should be much abated; [Hear, hear, hear!] Still he would again be universally the creature of the State, instead of States being (as they had been seen in some instances) the creatures of the armistice. [Hear, hear, hear!] A reduction of the military force of England could take place sooner than a similar reduction could be effected in other countries, but if we were to be precipitate in putting this measure in operation, while all the rest of the world were in arms, we should do that which would be likely to perpetuate that system which we wished to see changed, and which, if different course were pursued on our part, we might reasonably hope would not long be upheld. [Hear, hear, hear, and loud cheering.] His Lordship concluded one of the most able speeches ever delivered in Parliament, by moving an Address similar to that one moved in the House of Lords by the Earl of Liverpool.

Lord MILTON moved an amendment similar to the one moved in the House of Lords by Lord Grey.

M. LYTTLETON supported the original Address most ably.

Sir JAMES MACKINTOSH spoke in favour of the amendment.

The Debate was then, upon the motion of Mr. TERNLEY, adjourned.

SECOND DAY.

Mr. HORNER said, it must be within the recollection of the House, that, when it was put to the Noble Lord, whether the restoration of the Bourbons was the object of the war, he distinctly and repeatedly disclaimed it. Yet it was now evident, from the Treaty upon the Table, that the restoration of the Bourbons, and then maintenance upon the Throne of France, was really and truly the object of the war. Why then was not this object openly and manfully avowed at the outset?—With what view was it disguised? Why, obviously, for the purpose of obtaining votes in that House, and procuring a declaration in favour of the Whigs, and upon Europe. Many Frenchmen believe those declarations, construed as they so often were by the solemn pledges of the Ministers of England. But the believers were dupes. For himself, as well as for several of his friends, he could state, that he never was duped by these declarations, or by the pledges of the Noble Lord, because he always thought that to be the sole object of the war, which events had demonstrated. If it were pretended, as he understood had been somewhere said, that the conduct of the French army in invading the Netherlands released the Allies from their pledges not to force a Government upon France, he would ask the Noble Lord and his colleagues whether they, who always alleged that the French People were hostile to Bonaparte, and that he was supported only by the army, could consistently maintain that the conduct of that army could release the Allies from their solemn pledges to the People not to force any particular Government upon France; and it appeared that, such a view maintained in national credit, and thirdly, it was to be remembered, that if she failed to do this, we should then stand in the same situation in which we had stood when, in the opinion of some Gentlemen, we ought to have insisted upon other terms, founded upon permanent cessions of territory to be made by France. He believed that France would be able to pay the contributions which had been demanded of her, and that she intended paying them.—The contributions demanded could be met by the resources of that country—by the sale of Crown lands, by the augmentation of the capital of her national debt, she might be enabled honourably to fulfil her engagements. France, it had been stipulated, should pay an indemnity to the Allies the sum of 700,000,000 livres (28 or 29,000,000 sterling); but this was, comparatively speaking, a very inconsiderable payment, when put by the side of the other expenses which the late war had thrown upon her. In addition to this 290,000,000 francs, she had engaged to maintain an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men belonging to the Allies for five years. The expense of each thousand men could not be estimated at less than 1,000,000 of livres per annum; this army therefore would cost France yearly the sum of 150,000,000. From this it would be seen the sums which France would have to pay in five years, for the maintenance of this army, would be 750,000,000 of livres, making, with the 700,000,000 given to the Allies as an indemnity, a total of 1,450,000,000 livres. By a Convention concluded, the French Government had engaged to pay 120 livres a man (about 2s) on the whole force of 1,312,000 men, which had marched into France to conquer peace, and the last payment due on this account had been made. The ex-

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